O n May 9, 2010, a meeting of ministers of finance of European Union (EU) countries announced a €750 billion ($1 trillion) package to calm financial market uncertainty about the capacity of Greece and other countries to meet their outstanding debt obligations. The financial measures injected liquidity into the bond market and relieved some pressure, but they do not address underlying imbalances within the Euro Area and are unlikely to soothe concerns about the capacity of the public and private sectors to repay their debts (World Bank 2010) .
This chapter places current financial events in the context of large and protracted current account imbalances within the Euro Area during the past decade and analyzes the likelihood of reversing these imbalances in light of adjustment experiences elsewhere. The chapter is organized as follows. The first section links the current debt situation to large and sustained current account imbalances and examines their origin. The second section examines how the political economy aspects of Europe's crisis are influenced by the buildup of cross-border private and public debts. The third section sheds light on the likelihood of success of deflation-based external adjustments by examining deflation experiences worldwide during the past four decades. The last section provides some concluding remarks.
Origins of the Crisis
Between 1999 and 2007, the Euro Area maintained a roughly balanced current account with respect to the rest of the world, but there were large and sustained imbalances within the area. Greece, Portugal, Spain, and to a lesser extent Ireland incurred substantial current account deficits; Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands ran current account surpluses (figure 9.1).
Per capita GDP in the Euro Area grew 1.7 percent a year between 1999 and 2007, slightly above the 1.5 percent posted in 1992-98. Among the deficit countries, Ireland (4.5 percent), Greece (3.7 percent), and Spain (2.3 percent) were the economic champions of the decade. Portugal (1.1 percent) had weak growth performance, and Germany grew at just 1.5 percent a year. 1 Marked differences in the sources of economic growth across countries are uncovered by decomposing the GDP growth rate by component of aggregate demand (see annex figure 9A.1). In Germany and Ireland, economic growth was led by exports; in Greece and Portugal, growth was led by a boom in private consumption; in Spain both private consumption and investment led growth.
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain financed their current account deficits through cross-border financial and capital movements. These movements were facilitated by the adoption of the common currency b o u r g N e t h e r l a n d s A u s t r i a F i n l a n d B e l g i u m F r a n c e I t a l y I r e l a n d S p a i n P o r t u g a l G r e e c e in 1999 (which de facto eliminated currency risk) and the expansion of financial activities, most notably by French and German banks, as illustrated by the rising value of their claims on assets in deficit countries (Gros 2010 ) (figure 9.2). The sources of the large and widening current account deficits varied across countries (figure 9.3). In Greece and Portugal, the external gap stemmed mainly from a low savings rate, which in turn reflected high public and private consumption rates. Between 1999 and 2007, Greece's current account deficit increased from 7.0 percent to 14.7 percent of GDP. The widening of the deficit was caused by a decline in the saving rate from 15.0 percent to 7.6 percent of GDP. This decline comprised G e r m a n y G r e e c e I r e l a n d P o r t u g a l S p a i n G e r m a n y G r e e c e I r e l a n d P o r t u g a l S p a i n G e r m a n y G r e e c e I r e l a n d P o r t u g a l S p a i n G e r m a n y G r e e c e I r e l a n d P o r t u g a l S p a i n G e r m a n y G r e e c e I r e l a n d P o r t u g a l S p a i n G e r m a n y G r e e c e I r e l a n d P o r t u g a l S p a i n Differences in export performance are associated with huge disparities in the economic growth strategies and wage and labor policies pursued by European countries. Germany's growth strategy was export led; the strategies of Greece, Portugal, and Spain were based on expansion of domestic demand. Wage and labor policies supported growth strategies and eventually gave rise to wide differences in competitiveness. The dynamics of productivity growth and nominal wage inflation in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain with respect to Germany resulted in a steady increase in productivity-adjusted labor costs in those countries and flat labor costs in Germany (figure 9.5).
The counterpart of protracted current account deficits in Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain was the accumulation of financial and equity claims by foreign investors (mainly residents in exporting/lending countries) on income generated domestically in the importing/borrowing countries. The consequence of capital inflows has been a fall in the net foreign asset position of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain and a sustained increase in the net factor income paid to foreigners (figure 9.6). 2 Greece and Portugal were net recipients of factor income in the late 1990s, but the buildup of external liabilities reversed income flows. By 2007 net payments abroad amounted to 3.6 percent of GDP in Greece and 2.3 percent in Portugal, representing one-quarter of the current account deficits in both countries. Net payments abroad in Spain rose from 1.0 percent of GDP in 1999 to 3.2 percent in 2007, representing one-quarter of the external deficit. Because of foreign direct investment and foreign firms operating in Ireland, net payments abroad have always been sizable, averaging 15 percent of GDP in 1999-2007 and thus absorbing most of the trade surplus. 3 The global economic crisis put severe strain on government budgets and public debt, raising concerns about fiscal sustainability as well as external imbalances. The increase in fiscal deficits and the virtual explosion of public debt were immediate consequences of the crisis and the strong policy responses to cope with it (table 9.1). European governments resorted to automatic stabilizers and stimulus packages to partly offset the sudden contraction in private sector demand. The large increase in debt in Ireland was caused largely by the nationalization of its major banks. 4 Expansionary fiscal policies eventually limited the decline in output and employment but left government with debt burdens of an unprecedented magnitude (IMF 2010b). The global economic crisis has made the Euro Area imbalances and structural constraints visible (European Commission 2010). The issue of fiscal sustainability, which had been discussed in relation to the prospective budgetary implications of aging populations, has quickly come to the fore, because debt stocks suddenly reached very high levels and the fiscal consolidation needed to reduce budget deficits is of such a scale that it risks jeopardizing the economic recovery. External sustainability has also been a concern, because importers/borrowers need to strengthen their capacity to export and substitute imports for exports in order to be able to service foreign private and public debts without major corrections in the current macroeconomic trends.
Questions about the capacity of the public and private sectors to service their debts remain. How will the borrower countries of the Euro Area repay the debts they have incurred? How can competitiveness be restored within the monetary union without abandoning the euro and resorting to currency devaluation?
Policy Challenges Ahead
Recent developments have revealed two important aspects of Europe's crisis. The first is the political economy considerations constraining policy decisions at the EU level. The second is the assessment by the Euro Area countries and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) of the problems facing countries with large external and fiscal imbalances and the policy instruments available to address them.
The political economy aspects of Europe's crisis are influenced by the buildup of cross-border private and public debts that resulted from protracted external imbalances since 1999 and by the large fiscal imbalances that emerged during the 2008-09 crisis. Three stakeholders play an active role in shaping the policy responses to the financial turmoil: debt holders, Source: AMECO database (European Commission). Note: Automatic debt dynamics captures the effect of the interest rate-growth differential on the change in the debt to GDP ratio. Other debt-creating flows include privatization receipts, bank recapitalization, and recognition of implicit liabilities.
governments of Euro Area debtor countries, and governments of the stronger EU states (France and Germany). Debt holders harbor doubts about European debtor countries' capacity to repay their debts and expect that the stronger EU states and the IMF will provide funding to debtor countries that can be used to service debt. Debt holders, of course-especially investors who bought bonds at higher prices before the crisis-would have to absorb losses if solvency concerns eventually lead to debt restructuring. Governments of Euro Area debtor countries expect some financial support from the governments of the stronger EU states and the IMF so that they can attenuate the contractionary and deflationary effects of prospective fiscal adjustments. The governments of the stronger EU states (perhaps along with the IMF) would have to provide financing to avoid contagion to other countries and to ensure the viability of the Euro Area (France and Germany are not only the largest economies in the Euro Area but also the home of banks highly exposed to Euro Area debtor countries' liabilities).
In the diagnosis of Europe's crisis, there is consensus that Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain must improve competitiveness and consolidate public finances in order to reverse imbalances and restore external and fiscal sustainability. The fiscal adjustment programs recently submitted by several European countries suggest that expenditure-reducing policies are perceived as appropriate for that purpose. It is also apparent from the specifics of the EU/IMF rescue plan that the diagnosis is that debtor countries face a liquidity problem not a solvency problem. Under the plan, the Euro Area debtor governments are required to adjust budget deficits, and they are offered a financial backstop if markets are reluctant to roll over maturing debts over the next two or three years and seek to reduce exposure to government debt (Roubini 2010 ). Furthermore, no proposals have been advanced for restructuring public and private sector debts as part of the required adjustment.
As restructuring existing debt is not among the policy options under consideration, the reduction of debtor countries' foreign liabilities must be achieved by generating current account surpluses (that is, increasing exports, cutting imports, or both), so that the trade surplus exceeds net factor payments. In the short and medium terms, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain could improve their competitiveness with respect to both their Euro Area trading partners and the rest of the world through a depreciation of the real exchange rate that provides incentives to reallocate resources from the production of nontradable goods to the production of exportable goods. As all members of the Euro Area are strongly committed to maintaining the common currency, however, a correction of the real exchange rate by nominal depreciation is excluded from the policy options considered. To increase external competitiveness, these countries therefore need to pursue cost deflation, especially in the tradable sector.
The EU/IMF rescue plan intends to cut aggregate demand and reduce price and wage inflation of debtor countries, which is instrumental to achieving cost deflation relative to their trading partners. As the European Central Bank monetary policy ensures that the Euro Area average inflation be fairly low, cost deflation would require adjusting countries to undergo price and wage deflation. 5 The use of expenditure-reducing policies alone as a means to induce nominal deflation entails a number of risks. First, to the extent that it compresses firms' profit margins and reduces the incentive to produce, nominal deflation may slow economic recovery and even prolong the recession. Second, the fall in prices and wages may increase the real burden of government and private debts, exacerbating the problem of debt sustainability. Third, the trading partners of Euro Area debtor countries, which have themselves been affected by the crisis and are trying to consolidate their own fiscal deficits, may not be willing to accommodate an attempt by Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain to promote economic recovery by expanding exports.
Recent Episodes of Deflationary Adjustment
What is the likelihood of success of an adjustment strategy based on containing demand and seeking nominal deflation? To shed light on this question, we examine episodes of deflationary adjustment in the past three decades and assess their success record.
Deflation is a low-probability event. Out of 4,632 annual observations of consumer price index (CPI) inflation from 183 countries over 1980-2008 (with some missing data), there are only 232 observations of deflation, just 5 percent of the total.
The severity of a deflation episode can be associated with the duration (measured by the number of consecutive years over which the CPI declines continuously) and intensity (measured by the cumulated decline in the CPI during those years) of the fall in prices. Most episodes of deflation are short-lived (one or two years); very few episodes are long-lived (three or more years of decline in the CPI) ( figure 9.7) .
Deflationary episodes are heterogeneous in terms of intensity, and there is no clear-cut relation between intensity and duration (figure 9.8). The 132 short-lived episodes led to an average accumulated CPI decline of 4.1 percent; the 17 long-lived episodes showed an average decline of 7.0 percent. The steepest declines in the CPI correspond to some short-lived deflations. 6 The median of cumulated CPI declines does increase with the episode duration, but the short-lived episodes exhibit high dispersion in terms of intensity.
The most important episodes of price deflation occurred in the CFA franc zone in the early 1990s, in some East Asian countries after the 1997 Asian crisis, in oil exporters in the 1990s and 2000s, and in Argentina in 1999-2001. In the cases of the CFA franc zone and East Asian countries, deflation was accompanied by an economic slowdown or recession; among oil exporters, the statistical relation between deflation and economic activity was less clear. 7 The CFA franc zone is of interest because, as in the case of the Euro Area, it involves a multicountry central bank and fixed parities with respect to a large economy (France). Median inflation from 1986 to 1993 was 0.3 percent a year (figure 9.9), but several countries, including Chad, Cameroon, and the Republic of Congo, experienced deflation in 1992-93. GDP growth slowed during the deflation period, with median annual growth falling to 1.5 percent, down from 2.3 percent in 1987-91. The deflationary episode ended in 1994, with a balance of payments crisis, a banking crisis, and a large devaluation of the CFA franc with respect to the French franc. The devaluation of the currency eventually succeeded in boosting exports and output as well as stopping deflation: in 1995-99 median annual GDP growth was 4.6 percent and median inflation was 11.7 percent.
Deflationary episodes in Hong Kong SAR, China; Taiwan, China; and Singapore occurred in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian crisis. Following the large devaluations by Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, Hong Kong SAR, China, and China kept their exchange rate fixed with respect to the U.S. dollar, whereas Singapore and Taiwan, China, allowed for slight currency depreciation. As a consequence, these four economies lost competitiveness with respect to the other Asian economies and subsequently experienced a severe growth slowdown (table 9.2).
Argentina underwent three years of slight deflation before its collapse in 2001 (figure 9.10). During 10 years of fixed parity and real exchange rate appreciation, competitiveness problems gradually developed. 8 In a context of price deflation, GDP contracted 2. Two implications can be drawn from these episodes. First, there is a negative relation between nominal deflation and GDP growth, especially in countries with deteriorating competitiveness, such as the CFA franc bloc in the early 1990s, the East Asian countries that did not devalue in 1997, and Argentina in 1999-2001. At some point, these countries faced years of limited deflation and anemic growth, which hardly improved competitiveness and at best was instrumental in reducing external imbalances by contracting imports.
Second, as price and wage deflation did little to resolve competitiveness problems, the CFA franc zone and Argentina ultimately relied on currency devaluation to accelerate the external adjustment. 9 Changing the exchange rate parity immediately reduced the value of domestic costs in foreign currency, thus increasing the profitability of export and import-substitution sectors and adjusting real wages downward.
Concluding Remarks
The recent fiscal and refinancing difficulties in Greece-and to a lesser extent Ireland, Portugal, and Spain-originated from large and protracted current account deficits during the past decade. In Greece and Portugal, external deficits stemmed from a drop in the private savings rate and the expansion of the public sector; in Ireland and Portugal, they came from a boom in private investment. During the same period, Germany experienced large and protracted current account surpluses, originating largely from increasing private sector savings and declining private sector investment. A thorough understanding of the cases of Ireland and Spain is important for the management of transition and capital inflows in middle-income countries. For both countries, the past decade can be interpreted as a period of convergence, as would be predicted by a simple Solow model for the Euro Area. Capital flowed to Ireland and Spain from the rest of the world, especially from the rest of the Euro Area, because the expected rate of return on investment was higher there than elsewhere and the risks were considered much reduced by the common currency. Commercial banks and other financial institutions lent funds to private firms to develop new investment projects (especially in residential construction). The transition as well as the crisis was led by the private sector. Because of the risk that the private sector may not be able to engineer a resolution of financial disputes by itself, governments have not left the adjustment to market forces. Governments must step in to coordinate the macroeconomic adjustment and mediate the allocation of losses among economic agents.
This interpretation of events has several implications for economic policy. First, high and protracted current account deficits may accelerate the closing of income gaps across countries, but they also create huge adjustment risks. The argument that a private sector-generated current account deficit should not be a concern for policy makers is incorrect. Second, international borrowing has embedded an external effect that probably depends on the size of private sector borrowing and is not taken into account by private parties when settling their operations. Financial and capital inflows should not escape from some form of regulation requiring parties to internalize such externalities. Third, once a problem of bad quality of lending flows or portfolio assets is identified, postponing the resolution of the problem, including the allocation of the corresponding losses, is a welfare-reducing strategy, because inertia clogs the functioning of the credit system and does not eliminate risks. The challenge is to apportion the existing losses and move forward.
In Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, productivity-adjusted labor costs rose steadily after 1999. Together with the appreciation of the euro after 2002, this trend hampered exports to the rest of the world and within the Euro Area. In contrast, Germany's productivity-adjusted labor costs remained constant over the decade, providing support to a steady increase in the export share in GDP. Bringing down production costs in the context of a fixed exchange rate is a major challenge, which most countries examined in this chapter did not meet. Germany was able to maintain a tight link between labor productivity and labor costs in the past decade. Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain should do the same in the future. 
